

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

JUAN AHMAD MAYS,	)	CASE NO. 1:09 CV 573
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
	)	
v.	)	
	)	<u>MEMORANDUM OF OPINION</u>
CUYAHOGA COUNTY METROPOLITAN	)	<u>AND ORDER</u>
HOUSING AUTHORITY,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

On March 17, 2009, plaintiff *pro se* Juan Ahmad Mays filed this *in forma pauperis* action against the Cuyahoga County Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA).<sup>1</sup> While the complaint is somewhat unclear, plaintiff appears to be alleging that CMHA has poor management practices, and that some tenants have been improperly evicted for non-payment of rent. For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, *Boag*

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<sup>1</sup> The complaint also purports to be filed on behalf of Tenants Rights Association of Cleveland, Inc. Plaintiff may only file *pro se* on his own behalf, however. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654.

*v. MacDougall*, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.<sup>2</sup> *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Lawler v. Marshall*, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); *Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville*, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).

Principles requiring generous construction of *pro se* pleadings are not without limits. *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See *Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.*, 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. *Beaudette*, 775 F.2d at 1278. To do so would "require ...[the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate

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<sup>2</sup> A claim may be dismissed *sua sponte*, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. *McGore v. Wigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); *Spruytte v. Walters*, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); *Harris v. Johnson*, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); *Brooks v. Seiter*, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party." *Id.*

Even liberally construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting plaintiff might have a valid federal claim. *See, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ.,* 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) (court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief).

Accordingly, the request to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted and this action is dismissed under section 1915(e). Further, the court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Dan Aaron Polster 3/23/09  
DAN AARON POLSTER  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE